

SEMAPA - SOCIEDADE DE INVESTIMENTO E GESTÃO, SGPS, S.A.

GENERAL MEETING OF 18 MAY 2012

**REMUNERATION COMMITTEE DECLARATION
RELATING TO ITEM 5. ON THE ORDER OF BUSINESS**

REMUNERATION POLICY STATEMENT - SEMAPA DIRECTORS AND AUDITORS

I. Introduction

Semapa's Remuneration Committee drew up a remuneration policy statement for the first time in early 2007, and this text was then submitted to the company's general meeting that year and approved. The statement was drawn up under the terms of the relevant recommendation of the Securities Market Commission then in force.

At that time, the Remuneration Committee stated its view that the options defended should be maintained until the end of the term of office of the company officers. The term of office in question ran from 2006 to 2009.

It was necessary to renew the statement in 2010, not only because of the start of a fresh term of office but also because Law 28/2009, of 19 June took effect, making it mandatory for the Remuneration Committee to submit a remuneration policy statement each year for the approval of the general meeting.

This Committee is still of the view that a remuneration policy, due to its nature as a set of principles, should be stable for the duration of a mandate, unless exceptional or unforeseen circumstances justify an alteration.

We have therefore opted to propose for approval a statement with the same content as that currently in effect.

The two most common possibilities for setting the remuneration of company officers are significantly different from each other. On the one hand, the remuneration may be fixed directly by the general meeting, a solution which is not often adopted for various reasons of practicality, whilst on the other hand there is the option of remuneration being set by a committee, which decides in accordance with criteria on which the shareholders have had no say.

We have therefore considered an intermediate solution, whereby a declaration on remuneration policy, to be followed by the committee, is submitted for the consideration of the shareholders. The best course of action is to take the best features of the two theoretically possible solutions, as we shall seek to do in this document, retaining and reproducing much of what we have defended in the past, but also seeking to secure the benefits of the company's wider experience and knowledge and of compliance with the latest legal requirements in this area, as referred to above.

II. Legal requirements and recommendations

This statement is issued in the legal framework formed by Law 28/2009, of 19 June (as referred to above), and the recommendations of the Securities Market Commission for 2010.

In addition to requiring annual statements, approved by the general meeting and duly disclosed, the new law requires the statement on remuneration policy to include information on:

- a) *Procedures to permit directors' interests to be aligned with those of the company;*
- b) *The criteria for setting the variable component of remuneration;*
- c) *The existence of share bonus and share option plans for directors and auditors;*
- d) *The possibility of the variable remuneration component, if any, being paid, in full or in part, after the accounts for the periods corresponding to the entire term of office having been drawn up;*
- e) *Procedures for capping variable remuneration, in the event of the results showing a significant deterioration in the company's performance in the last period for which accounts have been reported or when such a deterioration may be expected in the period underway.*

The recommendations from the Securities Market Commission currently in force state that:

II.1.5.2. A statement on the remuneration policy of the Board of Directors and Supervisory Board referred to in Article 2 of Law No. 28/2009 of 19 June, shall contain, in addition to the content therein stated, adequate information on: i) which groups of companies the remuneration policy and practices of which were taken as a baseline for setting the remuneration ii) the payments for the dismissal or termination by agreement of the Directors' duties.

II.1.5.3. The remuneration policy statement referred to in Article 2 of Law No. 28/2009 shall also include the managers' remunerations which contain an important variable component, within the meaning of Article 248-B/3 of the Securities Code. The statement shall be detailed and the policy presented shall particularly take the long-term performance of the company, compliance with the rules applicable to its business and restraint in taking risks into account.

III. Legal requirements and the Articles of Association

Any system for setting remuneration will inevitably have to consider the legal rules, as well as any private rules which may be established in the articles of association.

The legal rules for the board of directors are essentially established in Article 399 of the Companies Code, and may in practice be summarised as follows:

- Remuneration is to be set by the general meeting of shareholders or by a committee appointed at such meeting.

- The remuneration fixed shall take into account the duties performed and the state of the company's affairs.
- The remuneration may be fixed or else consist in part of a percentage of the profits of the period, but the maximum percentage for distribution to directors must be authorized by a clause in the articles of association, and shall not apply to the amounts allocated to reserves or to any portion of the profits not legally available for distribution to the shareholders.

For the members of the Audit Board and the officers of the General Meeting, the law lays down that the remuneration shall consist of a fixed sum, which shall be determined in the same way by the general meeting of shareholders or by a committee appointed by the same, taking into account the duties performed and the state of the company's affairs.

Semapa's articles of association contain a specific clause, number seventeen, dealing only with the directors and governing also retirement provision. We transcribe the relevant passages:

"2 – The remuneration of the directors [...] is fixed by a Remuneration Committee comprising an uneven number of members, elected by the General Meeting.

3 – The remuneration may consist of a fixed part and a variable part, which shall include a share in profits, which share in profits shall not exceed five per cent of the net profits of the previous period, for the directors as a whole."

This is the formal framework to be observed in defining remuneration policy.

IV. Historical background

Since the incorporation of Semapa and up to 2002, all directors of Semapa received remuneration comprising a fixed component, paid fourteen times a year, and fixed by the Remuneration Committee, then called the *Comissão de Fixação de Vencimentos*.

In 2003, the resolution on the distribution of profits from 2002 included, for the first time, a part of the profits to be directly paid as remuneration to the directors, divided between the directors as decided by the Remuneration Committee.

This procedure was repeated through to 2005, with regard to the profits from 2004.

In 2006, the allocation of profits from 2005 did not provide for any amount for directors' remuneration, which was understandable, given that the profits already reflected a provision for the variable remuneration of the directors, under the new accounting standards applicable. The variable component of the remuneration was fixed in 2006 by the Remuneration Committee, also with reference to the profits, in accordance with the articles of association.

This is the procedure which has stayed in place through to the present, although since 2007 this has taken place within the terms of a remuneration policy statement approved by the company's General Meeting.

It should be noted that the allocation of a percentage of profits is not applied directly, but rather as an indicator, and also as a limit, in line with the articles of association, on amounts which are determined in a more involved process, taking into account the factors set out in the remuneration policy statement in force.

The percentage for the directors' variable remuneration has ranged between a maximum of 5% and a minimum of 2.23% of the net profits. In recent years, the percentage has been lower than initially, due essentially to the consideration given to other earnings received by the same directors in companies controlled by Semapa.

There has therefore been a constant procedure since 2003, with the directors' remuneration comprising a fixed component and a variable component.

Since the incorporation of the company, the members of the audit board have received fixed monthly remuneration. Since the officers of the general meeting started to receive remuneration, this has been set in accordance with the number of meetings actually held.

V. General Principles

The general principles to be observed when setting the remuneration of the company officers are essentially those which in very general terms derive from the law: on the one hand, the duties performed and on the other the state of the company's affairs. If we add to these the general market terms for similar situations, we find that these appear to be the three main general principles:

a) Duties performed.

It is necessary to consider the duties performed by each company officer not only in the formal sense, but also in the broader sense of the work carried out and the associated responsibilities. Not all the executive directors are in the same position, and the same is also true, for example, of the members of the audit board. Duties have to be assessed in the broadest sense, taking into account criteria as varied as, for example, responsibility, time dedicated, or the added value to the company resulting from a given type of intervention or representation of a given institution.

The fact that time is spent by the officer on duties in other controlled companies also cannot be taken out of the equation, due, on the one hand, to the added responsibility this represents, and, on the other hand, to the existence of another source of income.

It should be noted that Semapa's experience has shown that the directors of this company, contrary to what is often observed in other companies of the same time, cannot be neatly split into executive and non-executive. There are a number of directors with delegated powers and who are generally referred to as executive

directors, but some of directors without delegated powers are closely involved in the life of the company in a variety of ways, sometimes on a daily basis. These are essential aspects which must inevitably be considered when setting remuneration.

b) The state of the company's affairs.

This criterion must also be understood and interpreted with care. The size of the company and the inevitable complexity of the associated management responsibilities, is clearly one of the relevant aspects of the state of affairs, understood in the broadest sense. There are implications here for the need to remunerate a responsibility which is greater in larger companies with complex business models and for the capacity to remunerate management duties appropriately.

d) Market criteria.

It is unavoidably necessary to match supply to demand when setting any level of pay, and the officers of a corporation are no exception. Only respect for market practices makes it possible to keep professionals of a calibre required for the complexity of the duties performed and the responsibilities shouldered, thereby assuring not only their own interests but essentially those of the company, and the generation of value of all its shareholders. In the case of Semapa, in view of its characteristics and size, the market criteria to be considered are those prevailing internationally, as well as those to be observed in Portugal.

VI. Compliance with legal requirements and recommendations

Having described the historical background and the general principles adopted, we shall now consider the issue of compliance by these principles with the relevant legal requirements.

1. Article 2 a) of Law 28/2009. Alignment of interests.

The first requirement that Law 28/2009 regards as essential in terms of the information in this statement is for a description of the procedures which assure that the directors' interests are aligned with those of the company.

We believe that the remuneration system adopted in Semapa is successful in assuring such alignment. Firstly, because the remuneration sets out to be fair and equitable in the light of the principles set out, and secondly because it links the directors to results by means of a variable remuneration component which is set primarily in the light of these results.

2. Article 2 b) of Law 28/2009. Criteria for the variable component.

The second requirement established by the law is for information on the criteria used to determine the variable component.

The company's results are the most important factor in setting the variable remuneration: not the results seen as an absolute value, but as viewed from a critical perspective in the light of what may be expected of a company of this size and characteristics, and in view of the actual market conditions. The importance of the results in setting the variable component derives from the actual articles of association, which expressly provide for the possibility of "profit sharing" and limit this to a percentage of profits.

In setting the variable component, other factors are also considered, resulting in the main from the general principles - market, specific duties, the state of the company's affairs. These factors are often more individual, relating to the specific position and performance of each director.

Another important factor which is taken into overall account when setting the variable component is Semapa's option not to provide any share or option plans..

3. Article 2 c) of Law 28/2009. Share or option plans.

The decision whether or not to provide share or option plans is structural in nature. The existence of such a plan is not a simple add-on to an existing remuneration system, but rather an underlying to change to the existing system, at least in terms of the variable remuneration.

Although a remuneration system of this type is not incompatible with the company's articles of association, we feel that the wording of the relevant provisions in the articles and the historical background to the existing system argue in favour of maintaining a remuneration system without any share or option component.

This is not to say that we see no merits in including a share or option component in directors' remuneration, nor that we would not be receptive to restructuring directors' remuneration to incorporate such a plan. However, such a component is not essential in order to promote the principles we defend and, as we have said, we do not believe that this was the fundamental intention of the company's shareholders.

4. Article 2 d) of Law 28/2009. Date of payment of variable remuneration.

Specialists in this field have drawn attention to significant advantages in deferring payment of the variable component of remuneration to a date when the entire period corresponding to the term of office can in some way be appraised.

We accept this principle as theoretically sound, but it appears to us to offer few advantages in the specific case of Semapa and other similar companies.

One of the main arguments supporting this system is that directors should be committed to achieving sustainable medium-term results, and that the remuneration system should support this, avoiding a situation where remuneration is pegged simply to one financial year, which may not be representative, and which may present higher profits at the cost of worse results in subsequent years.

However, whilst this danger is real and is worth safeguarding against by means of systems such as this in companies where the capital is completely dispersed and the directors may be tempted to take a short term view, maximizing quick results by sacrificing long term potential, this does not correspond to the situation in a company such as Semapa, with a stable shareholder structure and management, where these concerns are inherently less of an issue.

5. Article 2 e) of Law 28/2009. Procedures for capping variable remuneration.

Procedures of this kind are designed to limit variable remuneration in the event of the results showing a significant deterioration in the company's performance in the last reporting period or when such a deterioration may be expected in the period underway.

This type of provision also reflects a concern that good performance in the short term, which may boost directors' remuneration, could be achieved at the cost of future performance.

For obvious reasons, the arguments presented above also apply here. It should also be noted that a system of this kind would have little practical effect if not combined with significant deferral of remuneration, which is not proposed for Semapa.

6. First part of Recommendation II.1.5.2.. Comparative information.

In relation to groups of companies whose remuneration policies and practices have been taken as the baseline for setting remuneration, this Committee took into consideration, to the extent of the information accessible, all Portuguese companies of equivalent size, namely PSI-20 companies, and also companies in international markets with characteristics similar to those of Semapa.

7. Second part of Recommendation II.1.5.2.. Termination agreements.

There are no agreements, and no such provisions have been defined by this Committee, on payments by Semapa relating to dismissal or termination by agreement of Directors' duties.

This fact is the natural result of the particular situations existing in the company, and not a position of principle taken by this Committee against the existence of agreements of this nature.

8. Recommendation II.1.5.3. Inclusion of managers in this statement

The Remuneration Committee has no proposal or statement to make on this issue, as it is the express understanding of the Board of Directors that it has sole powers over this matter and that it is not in the company's interest to comply with this recommendation.

VII. Specific Options

The specific options for the remuneration policy we propose are as follows:

1. The remuneration of executive directors shall comprise a fixed component and a variable component.
2. The remuneration of non-executive directors shall comprise only a fixed component, or else a fixed component and a variable component, as for executive directors, whenever justified by the nature of the duties actually exercised and their degree of responsibility and involvement in the day to day running of the company.
3. The remuneration of the members of the Audit Board and the officers of the General Meeting shall comprise a fixed component only.
4. The fixed component of the remuneration of directors shall consist of a monthly amount payable fourteen times a year or of a pre-set amount for each meeting of the Board of Directors attended.
5. A monthly rate shall be set for the fixed component of the remuneration of directors for all those who are members of the Executive Board and those who, although not members of such Board, perform duties or carry out specific work of a repeated or ongoing nature.
6. The pre-set amount for participation in meetings of the Board of Directors shall be fixed for those who have duties which are essentially advisory and supervisory.
7. The fixed remuneration of the members of the Audit Board shall consist in all cases of a pre-set amount paid fourteen times a year.
8. The fixed remuneration of the officers of the General Meeting shall consist in all cases of a pre-set amount for each meeting, the remuneration for second and subsequent meetings being lower than that for the first general meeting of the year.
9. The procedure for assigning variable remuneration to the executive members of the Board of Directors shall comply with the criteria proposed by the Remuneration Committee, and the total such remuneration shall not exceed five per cent of the consolidated net profits (IFRS format).

10. In setting all remuneration, including in particular the distribution of the total amount allocated to the variable remuneration of the Board of Directors, the general principles established above shall be observed: the duties performed, the state of the company's affairs and market criteria.

Lisbon, 16 April 2012

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